Projects
Projects: Projects for Investigator |
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| Reference Number | R000231811 | |
| Title | Privatisation and reregulation of network utilities | |
| Status | Completed | |
| Energy Categories | Not Energy Related 50%; Other Power and Storage Technologies(Electricity transmission and distribution) 25%; Other Cross-Cutting Technologies or Research(Environmental, social and economic impacts) 25%; |
|
| Research Types | Basic and strategic applied research 100% | |
| Science and Technology Fields | SOCIAL SCIENCES (Economics and Econometrics) 100% | |
| UKERC Cross Cutting Characterisation | Sociological economical and environmental impact of energy (Policy and regulation) 25%; Sociological economical and environmental impact of energy (Other sociological economical and environmental impact of energy) 75%; |
|
| Principal Investigator |
Professor DMG (David ) Newbery No email address given Economics University of Cambridge |
|
| Award Type | Standard | |
| Funding Source | ESRC | |
| Start Date | 01 October 1989 | |
| End Date | 30 September 1992 | |
| Duration | 36 months | |
| Total Grant Value | £90,456 | |
| Industrial Sectors | No relevance to Underpinning Sectors | |
| Region | East of England | |
| Programme | ESRC Electricity | |
| Investigators | Principal Investigator | Professor DMG (David ) Newbery , Economics, University of Cambridge (100.000%) |
| Web Site | https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=R000231811 |
|
| Objectives | Objectives not supplied | |
| Abstract | Aims and methods (as at end of award): The aim is to undertake an integrated programme of research into the privatisation and re-regulation of the major network utilities, concentrating on BT and electricity. The main objective is to draw on and extend the theory of regulation and principal-agent models to handle dynamic issues such as investment, technical progress, and repeated regulatory review in order to compare the static and dynamic efficiency of alternative modes of ownership and regulation in the network industries. The aim here will be to develop a framework within which the costs and benefits of alternative forms of regulation and ownership can be systematically assessed. The second objective is to explore the role of auditing, accounting and other information systems as well as data revealed in share prices, in overcoming some of the important informational problems facing the principal in the conduct of the principal-agent relationship. The aim is to examine problems ofimplementing different forms of regulation. The final objective is to quantify the costs and benefits of the alternative forms of regulation identified by the theoretical study, using time series evidence, cross industry and country comparisons, and firm-specific data sources. The costs will include the deadweight costs on inefficient pricing, the costs of X-inefficiency (overmanning, investment delays, inappropriate investment and input choice, etc), and the costs of operating the regulatorysystem. This will require an assessment of how the utilities have responded to regulation. | |
| Publications | (none) |
|
| Final Report | (none) |
|
| Added to Database | 26/10/11 | |
