Projects
Projects: Projects for Investigator |
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| Reference Number | R000238563 | |
| Title | Efficient and sustainable regulation and competition in network industries | |
| Status | Completed | |
| Energy Categories | Not Energy Related 50%; Other Power and Storage Technologies(Electricity transmission and distribution) 25%; Other Cross-Cutting Technologies or Research(Environmental, social and economic impacts) 25%; |
|
| Research Types | Basic and strategic applied research 100% | |
| Science and Technology Fields | SOCIAL SCIENCES (Economics and Econometrics) 100% | |
| UKERC Cross Cutting Characterisation | Sociological economical and environmental impact of energy (Policy and regulation) 25%; Sociological economical and environmental impact of energy (Other sociological economical and environmental impact of energy) 75%; |
|
| Principal Investigator |
Professor DMG (David ) Newbery No email address given Economics University of Cambridge |
|
| Award Type | Standard | |
| Funding Source | ESRC | |
| Start Date | 01 April 2000 | |
| End Date | 31 March 2003 | |
| Duration | 36 months | |
| Total Grant Value | £316,588 | |
| Industrial Sectors | No relevance to Underpinning Sectors | |
| Region | East of England | |
| Programme | ESRC Electricity | |
| Investigators | Principal Investigator | Professor DMG (David ) Newbery , Economics, University of Cambridge (100.000%) |
| Web Site | https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=R000238563 |
|
| Objectives | Objectives not supplied | |
| Abstract | Networked industries have attributes that make the design of appropriate regulation problematic, with consequences for competition. Market rules and the form of regulation influence the choices and strategies of agents using the network, while the network itself places constraints on the number and location of agents who connect. The proposal consists of two complementary parts. First, the design of efficient regulation for natural monopoly networks will be addressed by analysing distortions inRPI-X regulation and measuring the value of information available to the regulator. The researchers will consider the problems introduced by separate regulation of capital and operating expenditure, determinates of efficiency of regulated firms, and the possibilities for setting price caps using techniques based on benchmarking whereby the X factor is set according to an independent measure of productivity. A mixture of industry case studies, international comparisons, and specific modellingtechniques will be used. Second, competition over networks will be examined, concentrating on the internet / telecom and electricity industries. Game theoretic modelling, case studies, and empirical analysis will be combined to ask how competition and efficiency are affected by ownership structures, network access, regulatory approaches and market designs | |
| Publications | (none) |
|
| Final Report | (none) |
|
| Added to Database | 27/10/11 | |
